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Abstract
This study examines income inequity in access to health care in the United States. Given
the predominant and growing presence of managed care organizations as a source of medical
insurance and care in both the private and public settings, replacing traditional indemnity plans
as a lower cost prophylactic alternative, we speculate that the presence of Managed Care
Organizations would reduce, if not eliminate, any pro wealthy bias in access to health care for
the insured population in the U.S. We rely on previously developed methodology from the
EcuityII project, incorporating the health inequity index (HIWV), to estimate income inequity in
traditional indemnity and managed care plans. Our results are surprisingly counterintuitive to the
expected result that managed care was designed to have on access to care. The calculated HIWV
indicates a relatively greater pro wealthy bias in the managed care group. This result has
important and direct policy implications as public insurance programs in the U.S. contract with
managed care organizations as a lower cost alternative for Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries.
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Introduction
The United States has for some time been a conspicuous exception to the general rule of
universal health insurance coverage among advanced industrial countries. Though public
programs (most notably, Medicare and Medicaid) exist to provide insurance for some of the
members of the population unable to afford private insurance, the last three decades have
been characterized by substantial increases in the number of uninsured in the U.S. In 1977,
8.7% of the population had no form of insurance; and by 1987, the proportion of uninsured
had increased to 10.3% and to 12.2% in 1996; moreover, at any given point during a year,
the proportion of uninsured is likely to be higher [1]. Notwithstanding the availability of
public insurance programs, there continues to be concern about equality of access to care.
In particular, the roughly fifteen percent of the population without any health insurance
would appear to be at a particular disadvantage in obtaining health care.

Less obviously, the type of insurance coverage may also play a role in access to health care.
Managed Care Organization (MCO) insurance programs have become increasingly
important in the U.S. over time, with a corresponding reduction in the proportion of the
population covered by the more traditional combination of indemnity insurance with feefor-service (FFS) medical care. Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) enrollment
increased from 3% to 13.3% of the insured population from 1977 to 1987, and to 42% in
1996 [2]. If managed care influences access to care differently from traditional care, the
consequences are thus potentially quite substantial.
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We consider two types of access effects that managed care might have. The first, which
has drawn far more attention in the literature and which we deal with only in passing in this
paper, is that managed care would be expected to provide less care per capita as measured
by health care resource utilization. One would expect this result because of the different
economic incentives placed on care providers based on the business model employed.
Even advocates of managed care expect to see reductions in medical resource use as a part
of eliminating unnecessary care and providing necessary care more efficiently. A great
deal of research has been conducted on resource use in managed care, both at the individual
medical condition level, as well as overall.

Horizontal equity (i.e. equal care for equal need) has been compared among select EU
countries and the United States. The European Union’s Biomed Programme funded the
ECuity project, whose members worked on a multi-year multi-country project entitled
“Equity in the Finance and Delivery of Health Care in Europe.” The participants examined
horizontal inequities in the delivery of health care in their own countries. The United States
results showed that, for a given need, that although the wealthy do not necessarily get more
care in terms of volume (i.e. physician visits, specialist visits, and inpatient care days),
there is evidence of a pro-wealthy bias when actual expenditures for these services are
considered [3].

More recently, U.S. results show that there is an unadjusted pro-poor bias in medical care
utilization, and that as need, region, and the existence of private insurance are accounted
4

for, the bias switches and becomes pro-rich [4]. However, relatively little attention has
been given to the issue of the role of the type of insurance plan (FFS or MCO) in affecting
equity of access across income levels. This is the main concern of this paper. We use the
methodology developed in the EcuityII project to investigate the degree of horizontal
inequity in managed care and traditional insurance plans in the United States. In addition to
allowing for direct analysis of the effect that type of insurance has on equity in access to
health care in the U.S., this approach has the advantage of allowing good comparisons
between the U.S. and other industrialized countries for the total (insured and uninsured)
populations. At the center of the EcuityII project has been the insistence on the use of data
sets that are as similar as possible and similar statistical analyses for all countries; thus,
there are a number of international comparisons that can be made without speculating on
the effects of differing data sets and econometric approaches.

The first section is a brief overview of the definition and estimation techniques for
horizontal inequity in the delivery of health care. Since this is a topic that has been well
covered in other papers arising from the ECuity II project, this will be a summary rather
than the full explanation that can be found in cited sources. The second section discusses
relevant changes and trends in the health care system in the United States, with a particular
focus on the different incentives characteristic of FFS and MCO designed insurance plans.
We then discuss our data set, the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), and our
results. Finally, there is a discussion of the importance of the findings and possible
explanations.
5

Health Inequality Measures and Estimation Techniques
The health inequality measures and estimation techniques in this study closely follow
previous work on horizontal inequity in EU and OECD countries [3, 4]. Specifically, the
health inequality index, HIWV [5], and the indirect standardization method are applied to the
MEPS data set, with some additional grouping of data in order to compare equity within
insurance categories.

Unstandardized income quintile distributions report the average use of the particular type of
medical care by the individuals in the given quintile. The standardized quintile
distributions adjust the actual values by first estimating the expected use by quintile, and
then adding the difference between the observed and expected use to overall mean use. The
expected use is estimated as predicted values from a regression of health care use on health
status, age, and gender variables.

Standardization of need allows a comparison of the distribution of medical care across
income with a distribution that is adjusted for need. Health status (self-reported as well as a
measure of disability), age, and gender variables are used to standardize for need for
medical care. We identify three measures of medical care in our estimations: physician
visits, hospital nights, and total medical expenditures. Standardization is performed for the
entire insured population, then separately for the FFS and MCO populations. This method
6

of standardizing for need assumes that the health care system, overall, meets medical need,
in that on average, the health care system provides just the right amount of care for an
individual with a given set of characteristics to be standardized on. We can estimate what
that level of care is, and then examine the data to see if there are systematic income-related
variations in the difference between the amount of medical care actually provided, and what
needs to be provided.
A concentration curve approach is used to estimate the index for horizontal inequity in the
delivery of health care. The health equity index, HIWV, is a measure derived from first,
obtaining a concentration index that reports the degree of inequality in the distribution of
medical care (unadjusted for need), and second, a concentration index of need, which uses a
two-part model to predict utilization of medical care, given need. The cumulative percent
of the population, ranked by income, is measured against the cumulative percent of medical
care utilization (actual and predicted). The difference in the concentration indices directly
calculates the health equity index. For instance, if the need-adjusted concentration curve
lies above the concentration curve that has not been adjusted for need, then there is a prorich bias in the delivery of medical care, and the calculated index has a value greater than
zero. Alternatively, if the need-adjusted curve lies below the unadjusted curve, then the
interpretation is a pro-poor bias, and HIWV is less than zero. If the index is zero, it cannot
be assumed that no bias exists, as a pro-rich bias observed in one curve may cancel the propoor bias in the other if the curves cross such that the area under each (relative to the
diagonal) is the same [5].
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The prediction of health care utilization, as adjusted for need, is achieved using a two-part
estimation method. The logistic regression in the two-part model estimates the probability
of any utilization of health care. Part two of the specification uses a truncated negative
binomial count model to return the expected value of the utilization of health care, given
positive utilization estimates as returned in the logit specification [4]. We rely on the twopart model of demand for medical care for our subpopulations (MCO and FFS) as a better
predictor of actual outcomes than a sample selection model because of the smaller MFSE
(mean square forecasting error) associated with the two-part model [6, 7]. Furthermore, as
we are not as concerned with parameter estimates, per se, as with predicted utilization, any
selection bias not addressed by standardization for a particular subpopulation is likewise
observed in the estimation for the alternative subpopulation, and thus, still allows for an
opportunity for comparison between the plans.

A significant design note is the consideration of survey design effects. Models that rely on
standard regression techniques will typically understate the standard errors of the estimates.
This could result in attribution of an explanatory effect where none exists. The surveyspecific models take into account the design effect of the survey and are therefore a truer
estimate of the independent effect. To obtain estimates of variability (such as the standard
error of sample estimates or corresponding confidence intervals) for estimates based on the
survey data, one needs to take into account the complex sample design for both person and
family level analyses. The data set includes the appropriate strata and psu (primary
sampling unit) identifier variables, as well as a sampling weight (the inverse of the
8

probability that the observation is included in the design) to correct for the loss of precision
in variance estimation associated with the sample design (i.e. observations are not
independent and identically distributed in a complex survey). Simply applying the
independently and identically distributed methodology for analysis would lead to biased
point estimators and variance estimates that would likely understate the level of uncertainty
associated with the estimates [8]. The results will be substantially more reliable than
results obtained without considering design effects.

Health Care and Insurance in the U.S.
Over the last 30 years, there have been considerable changes in the structure of the medical
care industry in the United States. The changes are primarily associated with the
administration and financing of medical care towards a goal of increasing efficiency and
reducing costs. The result has been the introduction and prevalence of MCOs that have
made major inroads on the more traditional form of health care insurance. Of the insured
population in the U.S. (those less than sixty-five years old, as virtually all persons sixty-five
and over have Medicare), a significant number are now enrolled in some type of managed
care plan. In 1996, nearly 42% of the insured population was enrolled in a Health
Maintenance Organization (HMO), and nearly 36.5% of those publicly insured were
covered by managed care. This is more than triple the rate, 13.3%, of the total population
HMO enrollment in 1987 [2].
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Given the complex nature of managed care, it is important to note that the term “HMO” is not
often used in terms of its strict definition(s). To the typical user or provider of health care,
“HMO” has come to mean any plan under which the enrollee has a limited choice in provider
selection, and thus is often used to indicate any type of managed care plan. That is, it has
become the term that describes every type of plan that is not fee-for service. Because of this
common technical misunderstanding, the term HMO in our estimates includes anyone
covered by a managed care plan.
The 1996 MEPS survey determined HMO vs. other MCO enrollment based on a series of
questions about plan characteristics. The determination of the respondent’s status as an
HMO enrollee (public or private) was based on three types of questions: 1) Do you belong to
an HMO?, 2) Are you covered by your HMO if you see a physician who is not an HMO
doctor without a referral?, and 3) Must your primary care doctor be chosen from a list
provided by your insurer? Yes to any of these would indicate HMO enrollment. Because
cognitive studies conducted prior to the survey indicated people’s inability to distinguish
between plans within managed care, it makes sense to combine the MCO and HMO status
variables. In 1996, HMO enrollees were primarily covered by private insurance, tended to be
young adults and children (47.6% of the privately insured non-elderly population belonged to
an HMO), and were slightly skewed toward the upper income thresholds (45.6% high income
and 37% low income of the insured were enrolled in an HMO). Differences in health status
for HMO participants were concentrated among the publicly insured. Those who reported
needing assistance to perform daily activities, or who were unable to work because of a
chronic condition were more likely to be enrolled in an HMO [9].
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Of the total population (insured and uninsured) in 1996, the reported rates for MCO and
HMO were as follows: 1.7% in a Medicare HMO, 4.8% in a Medicaid HMO, 26.9% in a
private HMO, 4.5% in a private MCO, and .08% in a Medicaid MCO. In total, 33.46%
belonged to an HMO, and 5.4% reported membership in an MCO. In 1987, the data reflect
HMO membership based on the respondent’s identification of his health plan from a list of
local HMOs in each of four rounds. Estimates of HMO enrollment in 1987 use a constructed
variable that reflects full-year enrollment and group policyholders’ selections of HMO
coverage for their members [2]. Taken separately, the 1987 data indicate round-specific
enrollment rates ranging from 8.3 – 10.4% of the total population.

HMO enrollment increased from 3% to 13.3% of the insured population from 1977 to 1987.
This is not a surprising result as HMOs were not a dominant business plan in 1977. In 1987,
76% of people in HMOs had the option of choosing a FFS program from menu of benefits
and 31% of those enrolled in FFS had an HMO as an option. The result is that although the
members of HMOs are likely to be younger, they are not necessarily healthier. This finding
is attributed to the possibility that younger people with young families choose the HMO
option because it has lower out-of-pocket costs and that there is not an established long-term
relationship with a physician. Persons with chronic conditions such as diabetes and cancer
were more likely to be enrolled in a FFS program (probably due to a relationship with the
treating physician and the emotional costs of switching providers). The near poor (those with
incomes of 100-124% of the poverty level income) were more likely to be enrolled in a FFS
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- perhaps the influence of Medicaid enrollees or more limited options offered by employers in
“blue collar” jobs [2].

The transformation of the medical services industry from one dominated by traditional
indemnity business plans, to a market-driven industry based on the costs of providing
service has contributed to a variety of downstream changes that affect access to medical
care [1]. Some of these effects include:
•

the redistribution of the insured population from indemnity plans to managed care
(MCO)

•

a reduction in hospital-based services

•

a net decrease in the number of hospitals and long-term and special care facilities

•

the elimination of many community-based programs that target the medically
underserved

•

an increase in premiums and co-payments for the insured

•

policy initiatives at the state and federal levels that address quality and availability of
health care services and health insurance.

The primary focus of MCOs is to control costs through patient utilization programs and
financial incentives (disincentives) to providers. The most restrictive utilization programs
imposed on the provider would require that a physician obtain approval prior to using an
expensive test or treatment for a particular patient, or use only lower cost, MCO approved
facilities for patient care, despite medical need as determined by the physician. Another type
12

of financial disincentive for the physician is the utilization review. Upon review of diagnosis
and subsequent treatment, if the doctor fails to justify treatment and procedures performed
within the guidelines established by the insurer, reimbursement will be denied. MCOs also
use “guidelines” and “care paths” as vehicles to control costs. Rather than mandating
particular courses of treatment, social workers employed by the MCO (or the physician
provider group practice) will consult the doctor as to the insurance company’s recommended
course of treatment for a particular disease. A third and prominent feature of HMOs is a
utilization management technique that makes the PCP the “gate keeper” for referrals to more
costly specialists. In addition, the MCO physician is increasingly responsible for
coordinating all levels of individual patient care, e.g. contacting nursing homes or
rehabilitation facilities to admit a patient for care. This has created additional time burdens
for the physicians [10].
The predominance of MCOs has an effect on the amount of care provided because of the
incentive-based nature of the relationship with the providers, i.e., financial incentives placed
on providers serve as tools to manage resource utilization indirectly. These arrangements
carry varying degrees of financial risk (and reward) for the provider and the insurer. The
restrictions on provider care and the financial risks faced by the physician/provider would
predict lower utilization of medical care in MCOs except for the patient or physician who
aggressively seeks particular medical treatment.
Providers who contract with an MCO typically receive a preset dollar amount for each
enrollee, regardless of the actual costs of providing the medical services. A provider’s
incentive to maintain a profit may be a disincentive to more costly treatment such as
13

making a patient referral for specialized care or hospital admission, except in acute cases
[11].

Discounting may also affect the quality and amount of care provided to patients. As
providers agree to accept discounted payments for services provided, they are likely to
minimize costs and potentially put quality at risk. This is not a trivial issue in the health
care industry. An individual’s health may be compromised because of the incentives
conceived by MCOs (in addition to tort reform in the mid-1980s that limited a plaintiff’s
compensation for malpractice and legislative protection of HMOs against malpractice
claims). Under indemnity insurance plans, providers were more likely to make referrals,
order expensive tests, and provide “more” care if a medical issue presented or was
suspected in a patient (in part to avoid malpractice claims for missed or incorrect
diagnoses). A “treat ‘em and street ‘em” approach is more common under Managed Care
Plans than under indemnity plans. The disincentive to treat, except in the most obvious and
acute cases, is balanced against: first, the probability of a severe result due to misdiagnosis
and the consequent (possibly more severe or untreatable) health issues, and second, the
probability of a formal complaint to the state licensing board or a malpractice action [1].
These developments in the evolution of health care plans in the U.S. indicate that as the
insurers and employers look to pass along more of the cost to the enrollees, the effect might
be to deliver advantages in health care to the wealthy that would be financially unattainable
for others [12]. The expenditure inequity is likely to be magnified as many health insurers
now offer “tiered” plans that charge a significant co-pay to patients who elect to use a more
14

expensive teaching hospital for care - specialist or inpatient - and a discount to those who
use community hospitals [13, 14]. Employers are looking for reduced premiums (while
giving employees more options) and, as a way to control costs, insurers are passing along
the cost of high-tech treatment to patients. At least for now, MCOs that offer this
arrangement will continue to offer more “traditional” coverage, though at a higher
premium, and offer the tiered plan to employers at a 2-9% discount. Currently, PacifiCare,
with presence in eight states, Aetna (New England), Blue Cross/Blue Shield (national
presence) and Tufts (New England) offer this arrangement. Community hospitals, which
have been increasingly forced to close their doors for lack of occupancy, may see a benefit
as fewer people elect the higher cost academic centers.
The policy concern is that appropriate medical care may not be available for those who
cannot afford the surcharge. There is additional concern that people who live in urban
areas, where the academic hospitals tend to be concentrated, will be placed out of care as
they frequently use these centers as their “community” hospitals. In terms of measuring
equity vis-à-vis income under a tiered system, it is likely that there would be a pro rich bias
in expenditures on medical care, but income would have less of an effect on utilization as
measured by physician visits and nights-in-hospital. That is, if the wealthier population
substitutes the academic centers for the lower cost care, then count data such as hospital
and physician (specialist and PCP) visits will not exhibit inequities in medical care.
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Data and Estimation
The data for the US are taken from the Household component of the 1996 round of the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey [15]. The survey was conducted by the United States
Agency for Health Research and Quality under the direction of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services. It contains data on the financing and use of
medical care in the United States. There are four primary components: household, medical
provider, insurance, and nursing home. This study will use only the data from the
household component. The respondents for the household component include only the
civilian, non-institutionalized population. The data include information on health
expenditures, use of medical services, and financing of medical expenditures as well as
standard demographic characteristics.
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) household components are stratified
multistage samples that over-sample populations of policy interest such as the elderly, the
poor, and minority populations and have 22,600 observations. The 1996 Household
Component uses an overlapping panel design in which data are collected through a
preliminary contact followed by a series of five rounds of interviews over a two and onehalf year period. Data on medical expenditures and use for two calendar years are collected
from each household. The overlapping panel design allows investigators to estimate
current and continuing expenditures on healthcare and other population characteristics. The
sampling frame for the MEPS Household Component is drawn from respondents to the
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), conducted by NCHS. NHIS provides a
16

nationally representative sample of the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population, with
over sampling of Hispanics and blacks. The year 1996 was the first year of the panel
survey, and while public use files have been released for a number of subsequent years,
information classifying the insurance plans into managed care (MCO) vs. traditional (FFS)
was only provided in the 1996 data set.
Following the ECuityII protocol, we select variables that include information about health
care use, income levels, health status, limitations from chronic illness, and other variables
that might affect use of health care. The limitations of the primary data source for
ECuityII, the European Community Household Panel, meant that the number of physician
visits and the number of hospital nights were the two primary measures of use of medical
resources. We follow this by using a count of the number of physician visits including
office visits, outpatient contacts, and emergency room contacts. For hospital use, we use
the number of nights spent in a hospital. In addition, we use total expenditures on all types
of medical care as an additional measure of resource use. Total expenditures have the
advantage of providing some degree of adjustment for differing levels of quality of the
services provided, as well as partially compensating for the effect of different general
approaches to treatment - for example, heavier reliance on drug therapy for some
subpopulations vs. heavier reliance on hospitalization for others.
The income variable used is household after tax income per equivalent adult. Since the
income data in MEPS are gross income before taxes, it was necessary to estimate income
tax payments. The lack of sufficient geographical data made it impossible to estimate
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either state or local income taxes, but federal taxes were estimated using the National
Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM model where possible, which was the great
majority of the households, and simpler imputation of taxes by income and household size
for the remainder. The modified OECD equivalence scale was used to calculate the
number of equivalent adults in the household. Included in income were employment and
self-employment earnings, public and private transfer payments, and earnings from
property and other investments. Imputed rent from owner-occupied dwellings and fringe
benefits paid by employers were not included.
Health status was measured in two ways. The first is a self-assessed health status rating for
overall health of excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor. The second was reported
presence of any chronic condition that limited in any way the ability to work at a job, do
housework, or go to school. Age and gender were accounted for by a set of eleven agegender dummy variables with age breaks of 15, 30, 45, 60, and 70.

Results and discussion
As discussed earlier in the paper, there are two different types of results. The first is a set
of tables showing the actual and standardized distributions of health care by income
quintile. The second is a set of health inequality indices for different types of health care.
Table 1 reports the quintile results and Table 2 the health inequality indices. In addition,
Table 3 contains a number of tabulations that are of use in the interpretation of the results in
Tables 1 and 2. The entire population was divided into the five quintiles of after-tax
18

household income per equivalent adult, establishing income ranges for each quintile. These
quintile ranges are then used to report means for those insured under MCO and FFS plans.
As a result, the number, for example, of MCO individuals in a given quintile may vary
somewhat from the expected one-fifth since it is the overall population income distribution
that is being used rather than the MCO subpopulation distribution. Thus, when we
compare individuals in the first quintile of the MCO individuals with individuals in the first
quintile of the FFS subpopulation, they both fall in the same absolute income range, rather
than simply being the lowest 20% of their particular subpopulation.

Mean Resource Utilization by Income Quintile
The first of the two sub tables within Table 1 gives the mean use of the particular type of
health care resource under both MCO and FFS plans. The second sub table reports the
same information after being standardized, as described earlier, for differences in the age,
gender, and health status of the members of the sample. Overall means are reported, and to
give a sense of the degree of inequality, two additional summary measures are included.
The first is the ratio of the lowest to highest quintiles. A value greater than one suggests a
pro-poor distribution. The second is the difference between the lowest and highest quintile.
Here a positive value suggests a pro-poor distribution.
The most striking finding in Table 1 is that with managed care there is a clear pattern of
both less overall use of medical resources, which is to be expected, but also a clear pattern
of relatively pro-rich distribution of care by income quintile, when compared with
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traditional care. The actual number of MCO physician visits rises slightly as the level of
income increases, but when adjusted for the generally greater need of the low-income
population, the pro-rich distribution becomes very pronounced. Traditional care, on the
other hand, shows a slightly pro-poor distribution of actual doctor visits, which when
standardized, shows a pro-rich distribution, although not as strongly as the MCO result.
With hospital nights, the picture is somewhat different, although managed care remains
relatively more pro-rich than traditional care. Once again, MCO enrollees use fewer
hospital nights per person than traditional care, and the difference is more pronounced than
with doctors visits. The actual use is distributed in a pro-poor direction, but when
standardized for need variables, we observe an MCO distribution that is not obviously propoor or pro-rich, while the FFS distribution appears to be slightly more pro-poor than the
MCO distribution.
Turning to total medical care expenditures, we see a pattern that resembles the pattern
shown by doctors visits. The actual MCO expenditures are slightly pro-rich, reaching their
highest level in the top income quintile. FFS medical care expenditures are highest in the
lowest income quintiles, showing a generally pro-poor distribution. After standardization,
we find a pro-rich distribution in both cases, but more pronounced for MCOs.

Health Inequity Index by Resource Utilization
In Table 2 we report the health inequality indices for two different insured MCO and FFS
populations given three types of resource utilization, namely: doctors visits, hospital nights,
20

and total medical expenditures. The first two rows in each sub table report the adjusted index
for the insured populations under FFS and MCO plans, inclusive of all ages. We then
estimate the index for insured sub-samples by age. Specifically, the user of each resource is
classified as being either under sixty-five years old, or age sixty-five and older, as virtually all
people age sixty-five and older in the United States are covered by Medicare. (Until the mid90s, Medicare typically enrolled its members in a FFS plan with participating physicians and
hospitals providing care. More recently, the Federal Government has contracted with MCOs
to enroll Medicare eligible participants).
Each table by resource utilization includes an index for the entire US population (insured and
uninsured). For doctors visits only, we consider the previously reported need-adjusted
indices for Canada, the UK and Germany [4]. The first index for each population is adjusted
to reflect medical need [6, 16]. Additional modifications are then considered to account for
regional, private insurance, and educational effects [4].

For characteristics that are not standardized for, such as race or ethnicity, it would be easier
for disproportionate concentrations in the higher or lower income quintiles of MCO vs. FFS
users to create a bias. However, the proportions of the two substantial minority racial and
ethnic groups in the US, Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks, do not appear to be greatly
different in the two types of medical care. Private and public insurance, on the other hand,
do show substantially different patterns in distribution across managed and traditional care
plan users. This suggests the possible introduction of a bias because of different incentives
21

and provisions of insurance plans. Upon closer examination, much of the difference is a
direct result of the differences in the proportion of the 65 and over age group; the higher
proportion of the elderly in the traditional care plans is almost exactly paralleled by a
similarly higher proportion of those with some public insurance. In the lower income
quintiles, other public insurance programs start to have some importance, and the age effect
is lessened.
A potentially more interesting variable is the dummy variable for any private insurance.
Those in FFS are over twice as likely to lack any private insurance as those in MCOs.
Previous work has shown the provision of private insurance to have an effect on the degree
of inequality in the provision of doctors visits in the US [4]; it may be that taking account
of the degree of private insurance in managed vs. traditional care may shed some light on
the source of the differences in inequality. Another variable that shows some pattern of
variation is the census regions of the traditional and managed care users. Managed care is
better established on the two coasts of the country, showing up particularly strongly in the
West. Traditional care is more likely in the South and the Midwest of the US.
After including dummy variables representing regions and private health insurance to the
list of need-related variables, we see what effect these additional variables have on the HIwv
index. These are, of course, not variables that actually represent a plausible need for health
care; however, if their presence sharply reduces or eliminates the measured inequality, it
suggests that the added variables are possibly part of the reason for the inequality we see in
the estimates with the “correct” need variables.
22

Starting with the MCO and FFS indices for the entire population, we find confirmation of
the pictures shown by the quintile results. Remembering that positive index values are prorich and negative values are pro-poor, we find that for the three categories of medical care doctors visits, hospital nights, and total expenditures - the MCO index is more positive (pro
rich) than the FFS index. In the case of managed care, the index for doctors visits is
significantly greater than zero, as is the somewhat smaller index for doctors visits under
traditional care. FFS has a significantly pro-poor distribution of hospital nights, while
MCO shows a small and insignificant pro-poor index. In the case of total health care
expenditures, neither of the indices is statistically significant, but the positive index for
managed care is considerably larger than the index for traditional care.
There are a number of possible explanations for these results. It may be that there is a
problem in the standardization and that in spite of standardizing with self assessed health,
self-reported chronic limitations, age and gender, the lower income quintile users of
managed care are actually healthier than their health status suggests. This would mean they
actually need less medical care than estimated, while at the same time, this bias does not
exist in the measurement of the upper income quintile users. This could be the result of a
compositional effect. If a particular group, (low-income non-Hispanic blacks, for
example), were to systematically underestimate health status relative to its true value (there
is no evidence that this is the case) and if they were heavily represented in the MCO
subpopulation and not in the FFS subpopulation, it would artificially create an impression
of a relatively pro-rich bias in the MCO group assuming that the care they received was
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appropriate to their actual health status (relatively good) rather than their reported health
status (relatively poor).
The result of further adjusting the estimates for regional differences and private insurance
status, for the total population is as follows. The effect on the provision of doctors visits is
to make modest reductions in the pro-rich bias for all types of providers, but still leaves
managed care as clearly more pro-rich than traditional care or the entire US health care
system, including the uninsured. With hospital nights, the shift is in the pro-rich direction.
Managed care hospital night provision now appears to be slightly pro-rich rather than propoor, while traditional care is slightly less pro-poor than it was before. With respect to total
medical care expenditures, the addition of the regional and private insurance variables
essentially eliminates any pro-rich or poor bias from FFS, while only accounting for a
quarter of the pro-rich bias of the MCO total expenditures.
To put these findings in context, we can compare them with the inequality indices for the
entire US household population. While the MCO and FFS care indices are calculated for a
subpopulation consisting of those insured under the respective types of plan, the entire
household population includes not only the insured, but also those without any health
insurance. The health inequality indices for the entire population show a pro-rich
distribution for doctors visits and total spending and a pro-poor distribution for hospital
nights. However, all of these indices are more pro-poor than the corresponding indices for
MCOs. In other words, although all of the individuals in managed care have insurance, it
nevertheless appears that there is more of a pro-rich bias in the managed care system than
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there is in the general population even if we included those without any health insurance.
This would suggest that even the universal provision of managed health care insurance
would not necessarily reduce the degree of pro-rich distribution of medical care, but would
quite possibly make it worse. This is a counter-intuitive finding. Since one would assume
that the lack of health insurance would reduce access and, given the lower the income
quintile, the more likely one is to not have any health insurance; it would be expected that a
population with a substantial minority without health insurance would show a more prorich distribution of access to health care. However, the relative health inequality indices
show less income inequality in the general population than in the managed care insured
subpopulation.
There are no strictly comparable HIwv results for other countries, but some estimates are
available for the adult population in a number of OECD countries [4]. The HIwv estimates
for all doctor visits for three of these countries are shown in Table 2 along with the US
estimate for the overall adult population. The US HIwv index for adults is somewhat lower
than the index for the entire non-institutionalized population, but both are quite large in
comparison with Canada, the UK, and Germany. In comparison, the HIwv index for those
with traditional care insurance is closer to, but still more pro-rich than for the three OECD
countries.
When we examine the sample means by income quintile in Table 3, it is clear that the
elderly are a much larger proportion of the traditional care users than of the managed care
users and correspondingly, there are proportionally more children and working age adults
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among the managed care users. If children, for example, tended to be systematically
reported as being in poorer health than they actually are, it would lead to an overestimate of
children’s health care needs. This would lead to the conclusion that the MCO plans under
provide if they supply the smaller amount of care required for the children's actual
relatively good health state rather than the larger amount of need for care erroneously
suggested by the relatively poorer reported health status. However, in principle, this should
be taken care of by the age-gender standardization. The exception would be if only the
children of only the poor have their health status under-reported (or only the children of
only the rich have their health status over-reported). This may be possible, but we are not
aware of any studies that suggest such differential underreporting for any of the agegender-income variables. Another possible explanation would be that the out-of-pocket
payments associated with MCOs may be particularly burdensome for low-income patients
and as a result, these patients self-limit the amount of their treatment for financial reasons.
This does not appear to the case. Table 3 shows that the out-of-pocket expenditures for
managed care patients are well below those with traditional care.
We consider the “natural” age division in the US in the provision of health insurance by
examining the need-only adjusted health inequity indices for the sub-populations by age.
As with the total insured results, there continues to be a pro-rich bias in the managed care
plan for doctor visits in the under sixty-five age group. For hospital nights, the pro-poor
bias is carried over and becomes more pronounced for those under age sixty-five in the FFS
group and those sixty-five or older in the MCO group, while a pro-rich index is observed
for the under sixty-five MCO population and the over sixty-five FFS group. There is no
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obvious bias in hospital nights for the FFS group over age sixty-five. Examining the index
for total expenditures by age and type of coverage, we see that the positive index for the
MCO group becomes more pro-rich for the under sixty-five sub-group, maintains a pro-rich
bias regardless of age in FFS, and becomes negative for the older MCO population.
Finally, when estimating the indices for the age subpopulations, we introduce an education
variable (education is divided into three categories: less than high school education, high
school education, and more than high school education) in addition to the three regional
and private insurance dummy variables. These variables are included for the total MCO
and FFS populations to adjust for any advantage that level of education may bring to a user
of health care. When we adjust for private insurance, residential location by region, and
education by age group for doctors visits, more than half of the pro-rich bias that is
observed in the under sixty-five MCO population for hospital nights is removed, and a
significant pro-rich bias remains unexplained. Though not statistically significant, the
indices for the older populations change sign and the younger FFS population sees the prowealthy index approaching zero, indicating no bias. For hospital nights, adjusting for
private insurance, education, and region results in the elimination of a statistically
significant pro-poor bias in the FFS under sixty-five population (though the estimated index
maintains only a slightly reduced pro-poor bias). As with the total population, total
expenditures are not a statistically significant source of inequity in the provisioning of
health care as measured by medical expenses for any of the age groups in either type of
plan. Although not statistically significant, it is interesting to note the change in the
magnitude of the inequity within the MCO and FFS sub-groups as additional factors are
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included in the estimation. Specifically, some of the pro-rich bias in the under sixty-five
group is accounted for and the older MCO group has an index that is more pro-poor as
compared with the index that is estimated when only need is taken into account. In the FFS
sub-groups, we see a switch from pro-rich to pro-poor for the under sixty-five population
and a decrease in the pro-poor bias for the older FFS group.

Discussion of Results
The results suggest that neither the presence of private insurance nor the region of residence
play a decisive role in understanding the much larger pro-rich bias of the MCOs for either
the total insured population or the age sub-groups. This suggests that the privately insured
patient gets some degree of preferential treatment, and that region may make some
difference in access to care, but neither effect is particularly effective in explaining the
difference in inequality between the MCO and FFS plans. Furthermore, introducing level
of education has little effect on the results.
This leaves us with the consideration of more speculative explanations. It may be that the
“cream skimming” phenomena play some role here. If MCOs, which are more recent and
more rapidly growing than FFS plans, are able to attract the relatively healthy individuals to
switch from their FFS plans, that would certainly account for some of the difference in the
overall level of service provision. Those with pre-existing health problems may be more
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likely to stay with their current care providers, while the younger, more healthy segment of
the population is more willing to go with the less expensive MCO. If the MCOs are
particularly cautious about attracting low-income patients, with their generally poorer
health, they may either directly or indirectly tend to take individuals whose health status is
actually better than reported, although frankly, it is not clear what such a mechanism might
be.
It is also possible that there is simply a more substantial problem of discrimination against
the poor in MCOs than in FFS because of the different financial incentives in the two types
of plans. If caregivers are uncomfortable providing treatment for low-income patients, in
the managed care system there is no financial incentive to nevertheless press ahead with the
provision of care. Traditional caregivers may be just as loath to treat their low-income
patients, but since they will receive more compensation if they provide more care, they go
ahead with the treatment anyway.
An alternative explanation would be that those with higher incomes are more successful in
working the system to obtain the higher level of care they want, whereas the poor have less
of a practical understanding in maneuvering through the system. The higher income
patients may be better informed about treatment options and possibilities and thus are more
likely to insist on medical care that the managed care providers would prefer not to provide
on cost and efficacy grounds. The quintile distributions in Table 1 show much of the prorich inequity concentrated in the top income quintile, which supports the idea of an elite
group accustomed to getting what they want, applying their acquisitive skills to health care
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as well. With traditional care there is less incentive to hold costs down, so the ability to
aggressively pursue additional treatment is less important, since the care providers already
have a financial incentive to provide full and even excessive care to all of their patients.
At a quite subjective level, these last two explanations seem to be the most likely, although
certainly further research is needed to clarify the issue. The magnitude of the differential
pro-rich bias of managed care compared to traditional care indicates that whatever the
explanation is, it reflects a substantial difference between the two systems of care
provision. It may well be that the differences between the two systems lead MCOs to
discriminate against their low income patients, while providing more generous care only to
their well-informed and demanding patients in the upper income quintile. The financial
incentive in the traditional care system is to err on the side of overprovision of care,
inducing patients to consume more care than they otherwise might. To the extent that
demand inducement exists, it may be easier to accomplish with lower income patients, who
may not take as active a part in their treatment decisions. Upper income patients, who
know what they want, will certainly press to have their needs met, but since the incentive
under fee for service is to meet everyone’s needs, the higher degree of sophistication of the
upper income patients may actually have the effect at times of moderating induced demand
for unnecessary services. Unfortunately there is not much evidence to support these
conjectures, so while we can conclude that there is strong evidence for the existence of a
large relatively pro-rich bias in the provision of medical care by managed care providers
compared to traditional care providers, the explanation for this bias is not anywhere near as
definite.
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Table 1: Resource Use by Income Quintile

Actual Use
Resource Use Physician Visits Hospital Nights Total Expenditures
FFS
MCO
FFS
MCO
FFS
Subpopulation MCO
Income Quintile
Lowest 20%
20-40%
40-60%
60-80%
Highest 20%

3.59
3.55
3.65
3.88
4.20

4.66
4.06
3.84
3.86
4.02

0.62
0.37
0.44
0.21
0.38

1.45
0.83
0.62
0.59
0.38

2142
1699
1684
1605
2272

3197
2686
2153
2364
2219

Mean
Q1/Q5
Q1-Q5

3.82
0.85
-0.61

4.10
1.16
0.64

0.38
1.63
0.24

0.80
3.82
1.07

1880
0.94
-130

2540
1.44
978

Standardized for Health Status, Age, and Gender

Resource Use Physician Visits Hospital Nights Total Expenditures
MCO
FFS
MCO
FFS
MCO
FFS

Subpopulation

Income Quintile
Lowest 20%
20-40%
40-60%
60-80%
Highest 20%

2.91
3.34
3.78
4.07
4.43

3.93
3.82
4.11
4.35
4.50

0.41
0.30
0.46
0.25
0.48

1.10
0.70
0.75
0.78
1.00

1640
1563
1771
1718
2455

2483
2441
2431
2704
2655

Mean
Q1/Q5
Q1-Q5

3.82
0.66
-1.52

4.10
0.87
-0.57

0.38
0.85
-0.07

0.80
1.10
0.10

1880
0.67
-815

2540
0.94
-172
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Table 2: HIwwvv Indices

Physician Visits

Need
Index
Subpopulation

HIWV

t

MCO
FFS
MCO (under 65)
MCO (65 &
older)
FFS (under 65)
FFS (65 & older)
All USAa
Canadab
UKb
Germanyb

0.080
0.026
0.090

6.28
2.00
6.59

0.008
0.031
-0.026
0.068

0.28
1.79
-0.54
7.21

Estimation Adjusted for:
Need, Private
Need, Private
Insurance, and Insurance, Region Need (Adults
Only)
Region
and Education
HIWV
t
HIWV
t
HIWV
t
0.066
0.018

0.036
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5.08
1.38

3.76

0.044
-0.012

2.34
-0.43

0.003
0.005

0.10
0.25
0.055
0.011
0.010
0.010

5.49
1.87
0.91
1.32

Table 2 (continued)
Hospital Nights

Need
Index
Subpopulation

HIWV

t

MCO
FFS
MCO (under 65)
MCO (65 & older)
FFS (under 65)
FFS (65 & older)
All USAa

-0.015
-0.111
0.027
-0.152
-0.215
0.013
-0.081

-0.22
-2.08
0.33
-1.38
-2.26
0.26
-1.82

Estimation Adjusted for:
Need, Private Insurance, Need, Private Insurance,
and Region
Region and Education
HIWV
t
HIWV
t
0.032
-0.099

0.46
-1.89
0.095
-0.132
-0.172
0.013

1.13
-1.26
-1.85
0.27

Total Expenditures

Index
Subpopulation
MCO
FFS
MCO (under 65)
MCO (65 & older)
FFS (under 65)
FFS (65 & older)
All USAa
a
b

Need
HIWV
t
0.072
0.020
0.099
-0.047
0.013
0.033
0.064

1.33
0.76
1.78
-0.71
0.31
1.04
2.38

Estimation Adjusted for:
Need, Private Insurance, Need, Private Insurance,
and Region
Region and Education
HIWV
t
HIWV
t
0.055
-0.001

1.00
-0.05
0.077
-0.052
-0.022
0.024

includes insured and uninsured
[4]
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1.39
-0.80
-0.53
0.76

Table 3

Sample Means by Income Quintile
Income Quintile
Variable

Subpopulation Lowest 20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% Highest 20% Mean

Any Private
Insurance

MCO
FFS

0.48
0.43

0.87
0.77

0.97
0.90

0.98
0.93

0.98
0.95

0.892
0.788

Any Public
Insurance

MCO
FFS

0.66
0.67

0.26
0.40

0.11
0.24

0.08
0.20

0.08
0.19

0.196
0.347

0.21

0.18

0.11

0.07

0.05

0.122

Uninsured for all
of 1996
Age

MCO
FFS

27
37

30
40

30
37

33
39

37
42

32
39

Children under 16

MCO
FFS

0.42
0.33

0.34
0.27

0.31
0.24

0.24
0.20

0.17
0.14

0.276
0.239

Adults 16 to 64

MCO
FFS

0.48
0.42

0.56
0.45

0.63
0.57

0.72
0.64

0.79
0.71

0.661
0.551

Adults 65 & older

MCO
FFS

0.11
0.25

0.10
0.28

0.06
0.19

0.04
0.17

0.04
0.16

0.063
0.210

Hispanic

MCO
FFS

0.19
0.19

0.13
0.10

0.11
0.06

0.07
0.06

0.04
0.05

0.097
0.088

Black
Non-Hispanic

MCO
FFS

0.26
0.23

0.16
0.13

0.11
0.08

0.10
0.06

0.08
0.05

0.128
0.112

Female

MCO
FFS

0.55
0.59

0.55
0.54

0.50
0.50

0.51
0.50

0.49
0.47

0.520
0.520

Health Excellent

MCO
FFS

0.30
0.24

0.36
0.30

0.40
0.37

0.40
0.38

0.42
0.44

0.390
0.340

Health Good

MCO
FFS

0.27
0.25

0.23
0.23

0.21
0.20

0.19
0.19

0.19
0.17

0.210
0.210

Health Fair

MCO
FFS

0.11
0.17

0.07
0.09

0.05
0.07

0.05
0.06

0.04
0.05

0.060
0.090

Health Poor

MCO
FFS

0.06
0.07

0.03
0.05

0.02
0.03

0.01
0.02

0.01
0.01

0.020
0.040
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Sample Means by Income Quintile (continued)
Income Quintile
Variable

Subpopulation Lowest 20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% Highest 20% Mean

Chronic Limitation

MCO
FFS

0.20
0.32

0.16
0.25

0.15
0.20

Income per
Equivalent Adult

MCO
FFS

5951
6041

Any Doctor
Visits

MCO
FFS

0.72
0.73

0.73
0.72

0.75
0.74

Any Hospital
Nights

MCO
FFS

0.09
0.13

0.08
0.11

Any Health
Expenditures

MCO
FFS

0.86
0.84

Out of pocket
expenditures

MCO
FFS

Northeast Region

0.14
0.21

0.13
0.16

0.150
0.230

46965
48268

25517
22275

0.79
0.74

0.80
0.74

0.744
0.713

0.06
0.07

0.05
0.06

0.05
0.05

0.029
0.086

0.88
0.86

0.87
0.88

0.92
0.90

0.94
0.90

0.899
0.874

236
311

235
466

260
402

318
501

395
533

301
439

MCO
FFS

0.19
0.18

0.16
0.19

0.20
0.16

0.22
0.19

0.24
0.23

0.210
0.190

Midwest Region

MCO
FFS

0.17
0.20

0.24
0.26

0.20
0.31

0.22
0.30

0.21
0.26

0.210
0.260

South Region

MCO
FFS

0.31
0.40

0.33
0.37

0.30
0.35

0.34
0.34

0.26
0.35

0.300
0.360

West Region

MCO
FFS

0.31
0.19

0.26
0.17

0.29
0.17

0.22
0.16

0.29
0.15

0.270
0.170

13284 19575 27651
12948 19604 27681
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